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Abstract: Smartphone manufacturer provided default fea-
tures (e.g., default location services, iCloud, Google Assistant,
ad tracking) enhance the usability and extend the functional-
ity of these devices. Prior studies have highlighted smartphone
vulnerabilities and how users’ data can be harvested without
their knowledge. However, little is known about manufacturer
provided default features in this regard—their usability con-
cerning configuring them during usage, and how users per-
ceive them with regards to privacy. To bridge this gap, we
conducted a task-based study with 27 Android and iOS smart-
phone users in order to learn about their perceptions, concerns
and practices, and to understand the usability of these features
with regards to privacy. We explored the following: users’
awareness of these features, why and when do they change
the settings of these features, the challenges they face while
configuring these features, and finally the mitigation strategies
they adopt. Our findings reveal that users of both platforms
have limited awareness of these features and their privacy im-
plications. Awareness of these features does not imply that a
user can easily locate and adjust them when needed. Further-
more, users attribute their failure to configure default features
to hidden controls and insufficient knowledge on how to con-
figure them. To cope with difficulties of finding controls, users
employ various coping strategies, some of which are platform
specific but most often applicable to both platforms. However,
some of these coping strategies leave users vulnerable.
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1 Introduction
Mobile phone manufacturers are constantly developing new
and innovative features to leverage advancements in smart-
phone technology while maintaining relevance in the compet-
itive global market [9, 44, 62]. By default, for instance, both
Apple iOS and Google Android platforms are rolled out with
an enabled ad identifier to help users with personalized ad-
verts. There is also location which is primarily used by other
apps (e.g., Maps) to provide the geographical location of the
device.
Controversially, platform providers usually use opt-out
notices for personal data collection though it has been estab-
lished that users are known to keep defaults [20]. An opt-out
notice is an agreement that requires a user to make an in-
formed decision and take actions to deny consent. By default,
a user has given consent. Research knows little about smart-
phone default features or how they are perceived by users
with regards to privacy—whether users are even aware of
these features or the privacy implications of leaving them un-
changed. Like other privacy-related control settings (e.g., App
permissions), lack of awareness of manufacturer-provided de-
fault features (MPDFs) poses various privacy risks, e.g., acci-
dental data disclosures resulting in discomfort and regrets for
users [3, 16, 32].
Research has highlighted users’ understanding and behav-
ior pertaining to app permissions on both iOS and Android
platforms [7, 15, 16, 24, 35, 54]. However, these have mainly
focused on the permissions of downloaded or third-party ap-
plications. No work has considered permissions of default fea-
tures. MPDFs are different from App permissions in that they
are ‘features’ rolled out with the smartphone platform, and
users are likely to encounter them – from a privacy settings
perspective – only once in their usage of smartphone, that is,
during initial setup. However, prior studies have shown that
users pay no attention to permissions or settings [16]. Un-
like application developers, platform providers are usually in a
much more powerful position and, before installing third-party
applications, users already show trust in these platforms [47].
During initial smartphone setup, users are likely to skip and
accept the options on offer to start utilizing their newly ac-
quired devices. However, this behavior may lead to users shar-
ing their personal data with the provider unknowingly. For in-
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stance, when setting up a new phone, iPhone users are usually
encouraged to provide their Apple ID credentials to continue
with the setup and enable iCloud. However, the implications
of this action are not made clear, i.e., this will automatically
sync their mobile phone data with iCloud, something a user
may not wish to do. Other features rolled out in a similar fash-
ion include location-based services, ad tracking and sharing
of analytical data with the platform provider. Users are then
expected to know that these features are enabled. Moreover, if
they wish to disable them, it is assumed they will know where
they are located and be able to configure them.
To date, no work has focused on understanding how users
perceive MPDFs and the usability of configuring them con-
cerning privacy. Without such understanding, researchers and
platform designers can neither prioritize areas on which to fo-
cus nor develop usable solutions that empower users to man-
age their privacy effectively.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to conduct a
study on MPDFs—users’ perceptions towards them, their us-
ability and implications on users’ privacy. We report on a qual-
itative interview and task founded analysis, based on 27 iOS
and Android users. Using thematic analysis and task-based ex-
ercises, we answer the following research questions: (1) how
aware are smartphone users of MPDFs with regards to pri-
vacy? (2) In which context do smartphone users adjust their
default settings? (3) What specific problems (if any) do smart-
phone users encounter? And finally, (4) what coping strategies
(if any) do they adopt to overcome usability problems when
configuring their privacy settings for MPDFs?
The novel contributions of our work are as follows:
We provide a usability study of iOS and Android
MPDFs, highlighting users’ awareness levels and attitudes.
We find that most users are not aware of the privacy implica-
tions of MPDFs, they mostly learn about the risk from other
people. Some users treat MPDFs as part of the platform and
find no reason to adjust them. Being aware of MPDFs does not
necessarily imply that users can find and configure them when
they want. When setting up new devices, most users prefer
to leave MPDF settings in the default mode in order to enjoy
the features of their new phones quickly, mostly not returning
to change them. Moreover, while users are aware of the pri-
vacy implications of MPDFs, some are unconcerned and may
choose not to change them.
We provide evidence on what motivates smartphone
users to configure their MPDFs during initial setup or
usage. We also uncover their challenges when adjusting
MPDFs and the mitigation strategies they employ when
faced with such challenges. Our results suggest that the de-
cision to adjust MPDFs is not only affected by users’ privacy
concerns, but it is also dependent on their proficiency level.
When they know where to look, they are more likely to adjust
their settings. App prompt requests do not only raise awareness
of MPDFs but also motivate users to change them. Failing to
find where MPDF settings are located is a common challenge
for many users. These failures lead to a range of coping strate-
gies, including users resigning themselves to having their data
being utilized by platform providers, relying on others to help
them or searching for information online.
We elicit users’ mental models pertaining to MPDFs
and privacy as well as guidelines for future designs for
MPDFs. We identify 11 mental models that play a role in
users’ decision to alter MPDF settings, how they carry out
the configuration task and their coping strategies in response
to failures. These coping strategies vary: some depend on
the platform while others are influenced by users’ motiva-
tions. Our study also highlights that users want MPDFs to be
grouped under a single menu so that they are easy to locate
when they need to be adjusted. Furthermore, to raise aware-
ness, platforms should notify users when such features collect
or share data, and be more transparent about what data is being
collected and how it is being utilized.
2 Background
All smartphone features have initial settings or configurations
that a user is required to modify per need or desire. To change
these settings (during the initial setup of the device) – while
one is still excited about getting a new device —a user is re-
quired to understand the consequences of leaving them un-
changed. However, because of the time and effort required,
most users often skip or continue to accept the defaults with-
out any understanding or awareness of the future implications
of leaving them unchanged [1, 19]. Default settings can lead
to undesired privacy implications and affect users’ lives [60].
When Android users set up their phone (Android 6.0),
they are first asked to select their preferred language and con-
nect to the network. After being given a chance to transfer
data from another phone, they are required to either create a
new Google account or login with an existing one. If a user
decides to sign in with their Google account or create a new
one, then by default, they are opted into backing up their data,
sharing location, improving location services, and sending us-
age and diagnostic information to Google. The last step before
the home screen requires them to opt out of using Google As-
sistant. These steps are different when a user decides not to
use their Google account or connect to the network. Moreover,
some Android devices may also include the device manufac-
turer settings as part of this process.
To set up an iPhone (iPhone 6), a user is first required
to select their preferred language and region. The next step is
to connect to the network and insert a SIM card if they have
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not already done so. A user is then given a chance to enable
location services, set up their Touch ID and passcode. The
subsequent step requires a user to choose between setting up
their phone as a new device, restoring from iTunes or iCloud
backup, and moving data from an Android device. If the user
decides to set up the phone as a new device, they will be asked
to create or login with their Apple ID and then asked to accept
terms and conditions about using the platform. Users are then
asked to set up their apple pay, iCloud keychain, and Siri. The
last stage requires users to decide whether they want to share
diagnostic and App analytics data with Apple. These steps are
different if the user decides against setting the device as a new
one.
While there are many MPDFs enabled by default, users
are usually shown location services, backup features, and di-
agnostic or analytics data settings. Table 1 shows a list of some
of these features. Most MPDF settings are hidden behind many
screens; users are usually required to navigate through several
screens to find these settings (e.g., configuring Ads identifier).
Some MPDFs cannot be disabled by a single control, for
instance, location. Android users have to disable location un-
der settings but this does not sufficiently restrict location track-
ing. To fully restrict tracking, they are further required to dis-
able this under activity tracking. In iOS location services can
also be tracked through significant locations feature.
For Android users, these features can be more confusing
because they are sometimes obliged to also decide on features
which have been introduced by the device manufacturer, for
instance, using smartswitch on Samsung or having to con-
figure a second location feature on Motorola X. This is not
only cumbersome but also confusing for users because there is
never a clear distinction between the two – platform and device
features. Our study focuses on platform features.
MPDFs can be very useful to users, for instance, using
Apple ID to set up one’s iPhone may save them from perma-
nent data loss or enabling location (Android Manager) may
help a user delete their data remotely without the device.
Moreover, based on the information used during configura-
tions or setup, users sometimes infer default settings as im-
plied recommendations from the provider [1]. For most users,
leaving settings unchanged may be perceived as helping the
provider to improve their device or platform because of the
language used during smartphone setup. In most cases, this
gives users an illusion that they understand the consequences
of their decisions. However, recent events [46, 56, 57] have
revealed how service providers can misuse data, for instance,
information that is being collected can be aggregated and be
used to infer to someone’s behavior patterns. Currently, both
Google and Apple do not have a comprehensive list of their
MPDFs or where users can go in order to change these set-
tings.
Table 1. Android and iOS commonly enabled MPDFs. X marks
the features we investigated.
Android MPDF Apple iOS MPDF
- Location X - Location services X
- Improve location - Siri and search
- Diagnostic & usage data X - Analytics X
- Ads tracking X - Website Tracking in safari
- Google Now “Assistant” - Auto fill
- Activity tracking - Safari Camera & Mic Access
- Google Drive backup - Show Parked Location
- Photo Geo tag - Significant/frequent locations
- Voice Tracking - Raise to Wake
- Google keyboard - iCloud
(Usage statistics & snippets) - Ads tracking or identifier X
3 Related Work
There is a wealth of prior work on the security and privacy
of smartphones. Researchers have explored users’ awareness
and concerns concerning privacy, studied privacy leaks on both
Android and iOS applications, the usability challenges of pri-
vacy controls, and proposed solutions to help users manage
privacy. In this section, we discuss how existing works have
influenced the design of our study and the gap with regards to
the understanding of MPDFs and user privacy.
3.1 User Awareness and Privacy
Concerns
Several studies have found that smartphone users are more
concerned about their privacy only after realizing that their
decisions have put them at risk of data exfiltration through
third-party apps [16, 28, 53]. Shih et al. showed that the like-
lihood of users disclosing their private information was higher
when they were confused and uncertain, or the purpose for
such disclosure was unclear [50]. Others have found that users
are often unaware of the number of permissions they grant
through privacy controls [3, 4, 16]. Permission model stud-
ies [11, 15, 51] also reveal that users are mostly unaware of
how apps access protected resources and how that can be reg-
ulated. Moreover, Micinski et al. have shown that the majority
of access requests for features such as location information
sometimes happen without the user’s knowledge [38]. Felt et
al. and Kelley et al. cited complex user interfaces and lack of
understanding of app permissions by users as the main con-
tributors to misconfiguring app permissions [14, 29]. They
also highlighted that few users actually peruse privacy terms
and conditions. Despite all these efforts, users’ awareness and
privacy concerns of MPDFs have not been explored previ-
ously. We tailored our study to understand users’ awareness
of privacy-related default features.
King interviewed 24 iPhone and Android users about
their privacy preferences and expectations, and found that
users were far less concerned about sharing location com-
Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies ; 2019 (2):212–227
pared to other types of information available through their
platforms [31]. She also found that most App developers
defy users’ privacy expectations. However, King’s work is re-
stricted to third-party apps and does not consider MPDFs.
3.2 Android and iOS Privacy Leakages
Prior research on iOS and Android privacy leakages focuses
mostly on detecting privacy leaks through third-party appli-
cations [12, 18, 23, 30, 63]. Egele et al. [10] and Agarwal et
al. [2] have also analyzed third-party Apps for iOS. Egele et al.
found that more than half of applications were found to leak
the unique ID of the device which provided detailed informa-
tion about the users’ mobile activities. While these studies fo-
cus on preventing such leaks, they only consider downloaded
apps and not MPDFs.
3.3 Privacy Preserving Solutions
Others have focused on tools and applications that can be used
to help users manage their privacy settings on smartphones.
Works reported in [27, 34, 36] have explored ways to nudge or
alert users to configure their privacy settings in order to make
them aware when and how applications access their data. In
order to give users more control, several studies, e.g., [23, 49]
went on and designed tools that dynamically block runtime
permission requests, and those that enable users to deny data
to applications or to substitute users’ data with fake data. Other
studies have proposed crowdsourcing approaches to help users
decide which permissions to disable [25, 26]. Liu et al. sug-
gested the employment of profile-based personalized privacy
assistant (PPA) to alleviate users’ configuration burdens on
both iOS and Android [34, 36]. Tsai et al. confirmed that
users are better suited to performing permission management
tasks using tools such as TurtleGuard than with the default
permission manager [55]. However, these studies are limited
to Android smartphone users only and focus on app permis-
sions rather than MPDFs. Our study examines some of the de-
fault features of both Android and iOS platforms. In our study,
we sought to investigate from users whether similar tools for
MPDFs exist and if users employ them as coping strategies.
4 Methodology
To answer our research questions, we invited 27 Android and
iOS smartphones users to take part in an interview and task-
based study between June and August 2017.
4.1 Ethical Consideration
Our study was approved by the relevant Institutional Review
Board (IRB) process before any research activity began. We
obtained informed written consent from all participants to take
part in the study and to have the interviews audio recorded.
4.2 Participant Sampling
Most of our participants were recruited through advertised
posters around our institution while the rest were recruited
through our existing professional networks and word of
mouth. To reduce biases, we advertised our study as a usabil-
ity study for mobile platforms. Interested respondents were
invited to complete an online questionnaire tailored towards
screening suitable participants who could be invited to take
part in the study. We asked them to select which, if any, mo-
bile phone platform they used, how long they had been using
it, whether they had ever set up a new mobile phone before and
how recent was it. We also asked them to rate how confident
they were about configuring or changing their mobile phone
settings. There were demographic information questions as
well (i.e., age, gender, education, and profession).
We set out to identify a group of between 25 to 30 partic-
ipants who used either iOS or Android phones. We were look-
ing for respondents meeting the following criteria: (1) stated
that they had set up or configured a new smartphone before,
(2) had moderate to sufficiently high smartphone usage, (3)
possessed reasonable (self-rated) capabilities in configuring
smartphones, and (4) had been using them for a period of at
least 6 months to 2 years. We also asked them to state whether
privacy played any significant role in their choice of smart-
phone. Apart from this, the screener was also used to balance
the demographics such as age, gender and the type of smart-
phone they were using.
During the course of 4 weeks, we received 52 respondents
and invited 30 of them to take part in the study. Out of the 30
participants who were invited, only 27 showed up and com-
pleted the study. Three participants either failed to turn up or
declined the invitation. Out of the 27 who took part in the
study, 13 (5 males and 8 females) were Android users while
14 (6 males and 8 females) were iOS users. Table 2 shows a
summary of the demographics of our participants.
4.3 Study Procedure
Participants who were selected for the study were invited for
full interviews. Each session began by taking the subject’s con-
sent to take part in the study and allow audio recording. For
the main part of the interview, we employed two methods: in-
formal cognitive walkthrough and think aloud-approach. Cog-
nitive walk-through is a usability inspection method mod-
eled after the software engineering practice of code walk-
throughs [5, 40, 42]. Each step of the user’s problem-solving
process is observed to see if the user’s goals and memory for
actions can be assumed to lead to the next correct action [41].
We used the think-aloud approach to capture these thoughts
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Table 2. Summary: Study Demographics.
No. of participants
Gender
Male 11
Female 15
Preferred not to say 1
Age
18 - 20 7
21 - 25 10
26 - 30 5
31 - 40 3
45 + 2
Education
High school/College course 7
Bachelors 11
Masters 7
PhD 2
Employment status
Unemployed/Retired 1
Full time 8
Part-time 3
Student 14
Preferred not to say 1
Smartphone category
Android 13
iOS 14
Smartphone users per gender
Android (Males: 5, Females: 8)
iOS (Males: 6, Females: 8)
and reasons behind their decisions during tasks. The think-
aloud method we adopted was the coaching method where
participants are probed, prompted, and encouraged to describe
their actions while completing tasks [43]. We adopted these
two methods to elicit and understand users’ mental models
with regards to configuring MPDFs. To understand users’
practices and minimize missing out on other issues related
to MPDFs, during the exercises we asked users to report on
the challenges they generally face and the mitigation strategies
they adopt to alleviate such challenges.
We chose two popular brands of smartphones: Motorola
X (2nd Generation) running Android version 6.0 Marshmallow
and iPhone 6 running iOS version 10.3.2. These were the latest
versions at the time of the study (2017, August). At the begin-
ning of each session, each participant was given a device run-
ning the OS that they stated that they were using and comfort-
able with, reset to default settings. The participant was asked
to complete four (4) different tasks depending on their OS plat-
form, the whole session lasting between 30 and 45 minutes in
total. On average each participant took 7 minutes to complete
each task together with answering related questions. Before
completing each task, participants were asked some questions
related to the feature they were about to configure. This was
done to clarify if the participants were familiar with the fea-
ture being discussed. However, to avoid priming participants,
we excluded questions which could affect their actions while
completing the task. For instance, if the task was to disable or
limit ad tracking, then we would ask participants how they felt
about browsing activities being monitored for targeted adver-
tising purposes rather than asking if they knew such features
are sometimes enabled by default. Section 4.3.1 explains these
tasks in detail.
For both sets of users (iOS and Android), we started by
asking them to disable Location service for all apps, a default
feature (e.g., location) which is required by other downloaded
apps to run, and then ad tracking. The order of these tasks was
intentional; we started with the location feature because it is
a commonly recognizable and requested mobile service. Af-
ter these three tasks, each participant was asked to complete a
task which was specific to their platform; Android users were
asked to restrict sharing Usage and Diagnostic Reports while
iOS users were asked to disable Analytics Data sharing. As
each participant completed each task, we observed and noted
their actions and decisions. Where necessary, we asked them
questions for clarity. At the end of each session, we asked each
participant to share their views on the study and default fea-
tures before we compensated them with a small payment in
Amazon vouchers ($10.00) for taking part in the study.
We considered observing users configuring out of box de-
vices. However, during our pre-study pilot, some users noted
discomfort using their personal accounts to set up our devices.
When we gave them accounts to use, some users intentionally
skipped some settings and stated that they deliberately did so
because they were not setting up their own phone. This may
have negatively influenced our result, and they would not re-
flect how users indeed set up their mobile phones. Checking
participants’ settings on their own mobile devices would not
be in line with ethical research practices either. Hence, we re-
lied on their report.
4.3.1 Privacy Task-based Exercises
In order to understand the usability of configuring privacy for
MPDFs, we designed 3 tasks applicable to both iOS and An-
droid and one task specific to each platform.
These tasks were based on privacy control configurations
consistent with the default setup procedures of either iOS or
Android when using the smartphones provided to our partici-
pants. The intention was to replicate real task-based scenarios
like what the participant would normally encounter when con-
figuring their smartphones in the first instance or during usage.
Our focus was on privacy-related default settings which were
present in both platforms or related to privacy. Although there
are other default features such as Siri and Google Assistant
which have privacy implications, we excluded them from the
tasks list because they are not enabled by default. Neverthe-
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less, we still asked our participants if they had these features
enabled in their own devices. We chose the following tasks:
Disable location services.
We asked participants to locate and disable the location ser-
vices on the smartphone. Since location service is one of the
most demanded services on smartphones [4], our aim was to
investigate if users can locate and disable this feature. We then
asked them the privacy implications of disabling this feature,
and if they have it enabled on their phones. For iOS users, we
further asked them if features such as Find my iPhone would
continue to work properly.
Restrict App from using a default feature.
To understand whether users understood the implications of
MPDF settings on other applications (i.e., downloaded third-
party and platform apps), we asked participants to disable a
default feature on the device to restrict other apps from access-
ing it. In iOS, a Camera application defaults to tagging GPS
information on all photos. Therefore, in this task we asked
our iOS participants to restrict the Camera App from tag-
ging their photos with location. However, since Android im-
plements this feature differently, we asked our participants to
restrict their Google App from having access to their Calendar
and Location services.
Disable/Limit ad tracking.
We asked participants whether they received adverts on their
smartphones regularly and if they monitored or regulated the
ads that they received. Our focus question then required par-
ticipants to disable or limit ad tracking on the device provided.
The purpose of this task was to investigate if participants could
locate and adjust this feature and to find out if they understood
the impact of MPDFs on other third-party applications. Fig-
ure 1 shows default settings for both platforms.
Restrict Usage and Diagnostic Report (Android only).
We asked our Android participants how often they used in-
teractive options available to communicate with software app
designers on their smartphone. We intended to investigate
whether users were aware of and open to sharing app data
with developers. Thus, we asked participants to locate and re-
strict Diagnostic and Usage report on the smartphone.
Disable analytical data sharing (iOS only).
To understand iOS users’ willingness to share their personal
data with platform developers intentionally, we asked them to
locate and disable the sharing of the device’s analytical data.
In the previous versions of iOS (e.g., 10.2), this feature was
labeled Diagnostics & Usage. Asking users to carry out this
task also gave us an opportunity to understand whether users
felt conflicted, and to what degree, when deciding to share data
with the provider to improve the platform performance.
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. (a) iOS Ad-Tracker controls (b) Android Ad-Tracker controls
4.4 Thematic Analysis
Data analysis commenced after the first five sessions: audio
files were transcribed, and notes were consolidated, then we
started thematic coding. The first five transcripts included both
Android and iOS user responses. After we familiarized our-
selves with the data, two researchers independently generated
a list of codes. The two researchers then met and consolidated
the most noticeable codes and themes into a shared code-
book [6, 48]. We aimed to find relationships between each
group where possible, noting similarities that were observed
and of an important distinction. The initial coding revealed
several interesting codes which were consistent in each group
of users of a brand of smartphone. However, as the two re-
searchers continued with grouping, we started to notice pat-
terns that cut across both platforms. Then, we began to merge
and outline clear definitions from our coding scheme and allo-
cate names to each distinct theme. One researcher then con-
tinued to code the rest of the scripts while the second re-
searcher just coded another five to ensure reliability. Our Co-
hen’s Kappa inter-annotator agreement was 0.89, which is ac-
ceptable for qualitative studies. Where there were disagree-
ments about codes and themes, we redefined the code or the
theme that was contested. In the end, we generated a “thematic
map” of our data analysis (See Fig. 2).
5 Key Findings
Our results are purely qualitative but to provide context we
will sometimes report on the number of participants in a given
category. Fig. 2 presents an overview of our key findings. We
next detail each of these findings:
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Motivations
Proficiency Driven Prompts Driven Privacy Driven Policy Driven
Awareness Level
MPDF Aware and Privacy 
Conscious
MPDF and Privacy 
Unaware
MPDF Aware, Privacy 
Unconcerned
MPDF Unaware, Privacy 
Conscious
Causes of failure
Poor Understanding of 
App Request
Mental Models
Inadequate Information
Coping strategies
Seeking Help
Trial and Error
Giving upQuick Fixes
Survivalist Approach
Going back to the 
basics
Head in the sand
Aﬀect choice >
Lead to >
Aﬀect choice >
Aﬀect choice >
Fig. 2. Key Findings: Illustration of how key findings (awareness levels, motivations and coping strategies) are related to each other.
When users encounter some challenges while attempting to configure MPDFs, they adopt some coping strategies. Their choice of cop-
ing strategy is dependent on the type of setback, their perception of MPDFs, how data flow within their smartphone, and their motivation
to configure MPDFs.
Table 3. Awareness Groups: Most participants had encountered
some MPDFs before, but those who reported knowing about them
were mostly aware of common ones such as location services and
personal assistants (i.e., Siri and Google Assistant). Most of them
(11) claimed having never thought that they are sharing their data
with the platform provider.
Awareness Group Android iOS
MPDF Aware and Privacy Conscious users 3 3
MPDF Aware with limited concern 7 4
The Unaware 3 3
MPDF Unaware but Privacy Conscious 1 3
5.1 Awareness Level
Our analysis revealed four categories or levels of awareness of
MPDFs among participants: the aware and privacy-conscious;
aware with limited concern; the unaware; and MPDF unaware
but privacy-conscious. These groups corroborate and enrich
those found in prior work (e.g., Lin et al. [33]).
Users learn about MPDFs from different sources. Out of
the 27 participants we recruited, thirteen (13) mentioned that
they learned about MPDFs from social media and blogs posts
while five (5) reported that they were made aware of MPDFs
by their family members, friends and work colleagues. We
found that in most cases, people are only made aware of the
existence of MPDFs ordinarily for functionality purposes (i.e.,
they get to know about some of these features when wishing
to accomplish a task) but not for privacy implications of such
controls.
5.1.1 MPDF Aware and Privacy Conscious users
This is a category of participants who showed knowledge
about MPDFs and had a high level of privacy awareness. Most
respondents from this category were conversant with smart-
phone MPDFs, and they were able to distinguish these fea-
tures from other settings. They were able to locate and adjust
MPDFs when asked. One participant said,
“...I am completely paranoid with sharing my data ...
when I first got my phone the first thing I did was disable most
of my default features because I felt they were too intrusive...
only turn them on occasion when I had the need...” P4
Most of these users learn about MPDFs from online plat-
forms such as social media and blogs posts, while one reported
that they were made aware of MPDFs by a family member.
5.1.2 MPDF Aware with limited concern
Our study revealed a group of users who were aware but with
limited concern for privacy. This group had some knowledge
of MPDFs but did not give it enough consideration when it
came to safeguarding their sensitive data. We further identified
two subcategories of users within this group. The first included
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users who were aware but mostly passive when it came to pri-
vacy. They bought into the popular cliché that their data was
going to be taken anyway whether or not they made any effort
to protect it. For example, P5 and P21 said respectively:
“...I have done some research as regards manufacturer
features and privacy...but I can imagine that most people are
like me...who try to make their lives easier by not caring too
much about privacy.”
“...in my interaction with many smartphone users, privacy
and security are the least of their concerns, so long as the
phone can deliver the functions they required...”
The second subcategory of users was aware but had not
taken time to understand the privacy implications of MPDFs
or how to carry out privacy-related configurations. P11 said:
“I am from computer science...and still there are things I
don’t know...we are not really aware of the things we should
think about...you might think of obvious things like the loca-
tion... but what about ad tracker. That didn’t cross my mind...”
5.1.3 The Unaware
Our analysis also revealed a group of users who were gen-
uinely not well informed about MPDFs and their implications
on user privacy. Furthermore, this group did not have any
understanding of privacy controls. They ideally agreed that
their motivation for acquiring and using smartphones stemmed
from many reasons other than privacy such as vogue, aesthetic
features of the smartphone and status (mainly iPhone users).
Some of these participants admitted that the closest they came
to be aware of privacy and its implications (or that they could
be affected) originated only from recent privacy and security
incidents not necessarily related to smartphones, like Wan-
naCry1. Although these users are always buying new smart-
phones, they do not consider MPDFs or their privacy implica-
tions. For instance, P12 and P15 said respectively:
“A lot of us just don’t really know... all this is technical...
I always run away from what I don’t understand...”
“If there is something new (smartphone) I want to buy it...I
don’t really care about privacy”
5.1.4 MPDF Unaware but Privacy Conscious
Some users knew very little about MPDFs and their privacy
implications. However, their responses during the interview
suggested that they were concerned about privacy. They did
everything they could to protect themselves, for instance, they
concerted their efforts to peruse some aspects of terms and
conditions to be secure. However, because of their lack of
1 http://malware.wikia.com/wiki/WannaCry
awareness of MPDFs, they ended up sharing private data with
platforms unknowingly. During the task-based exercises, they
managed to complete some tasks successfully through trial and
error. After completing the study tasks, they quickly altered
default settings in their personal smartphones.
“I feel so annoyed that they [manufacturers] have data on
me that I didn’t consent to in the first place... It is not great
that apps have information about you.” P2
5.2 Motivations
Our analysis revealed that users’ motivations to adjust MPDFs
were based on their own proficiency, app request prompt, pol-
icy, and privacy concerns.
5.2.1 Motivated by Proficiency
The experts. We found that some users adjust their MPDFs
because they know and understand the implications of these
features – where the settings are or could be located and how
they work. They are experts, and conversant with the settings
by intuition though they notified us that their own devices
were different from the one used in the study. They config-
ure MPDFs all the time, disabling and enabling as they need
and wish.
P21, an “expert” explained, “Manufacturers want to get
as much data from users in order to improve their services
and for the allocation of relevant adverts to interested users
to generate revenue...they will take every opportunity to get
data in return...I use Siri but not frequently...not until recently
did I begin to use iCloud...I do however use a UC browser
which has an ad blocker...I find websites these days asking me
to reload or disable my browser that does not support arbi-
trary adverts...”
The overconfident. Since we asked participants to rate
their adeptness in configuring smartphones, we aimed to find
out if users who highly rated themselves could complete the
study successfully. During the exercises, we noticed that some
users failed to locate and configure these settings though they
had perceived themselves as experts. While some overesti-
mated their self-efficacy and failed to complete some tasks, we
found that sometimes being overconfident encourages people
to explore their phone features more.
The non-tech savvy Some users who rated and reported
having low skill levels in configuring settings stated they do
sometimes “fiddle around” with their smartphones to check
what settings are available. However, they confessed that they
never try to change anything.
5.2.2 Motivated by App Request Prompt
A group of our participants informed us that sometimes they
adjust their MPDFs because they get prompted by some apps
to do so. Our analysis revealed that this category of users either
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Table 4. Mental model distribution among participants. Multiple mental models may be held by a participant at the same time.
Mental Model Affect user’s Used as a coping No. of Occurrences
decision to configure Strategy Android iOS
- Functionality first, settings later X 13 11
- The internet has all the answers X 9 11
- Privacy as a physical security attribute X 9 8
- Mobile configurations are easy to manage X 7 9
- Providers are trustworthy X X 4 11
- Laissez Faire attitude X X 8 5
- Zero check: Privacy not a concern at initial set up. X X 5 8
- Privacy is security X 9 3
- One-time configuration X 4 6
- No prompt, no need for configurations X X 6 3
- Configuration breaks functionality X X 6 2
ignored these nudges or simply granted all app permissions
in order to continue using the service functionalities without
much concern for what the app requested to access.
P2 said, “...unless it pops up...then would I eventually re-
alize that I need to look at data setting...”
5.2.3 Motivated by Mandatory Policies
Some participants were driven to consider MPDFs only when
they were constrained to do so by policies. The mandatory
setup policies embedded in smartphones often compel users
to make decisions on MPDFs – they are forced to either leave
them enabled or not use the feature on the phone at all. For
instance, before Android version 6, Android offered users a
choice to either accept all app request or delete the app. If
users denied the request, then they would lose all the app func-
tionality. Users reported having to use MPDFs because their
platform did not give them a choice, e.g., being forced to use
iCloud credentials to set up an iPhone.
“...how was I supposed to continue... I had to... I didn’t
want to break my phone.” P7
5.2.4 Motivated by Privacy Concerns
Some participants adjust MPDFs out of concern for their sen-
sitive data. This group overlaps with those that adjust their
MPDFs out of expertise, in the sense that they adjust their
MPDFs because they understand the implications of MPDFs.
Many people in this group simply turned off all possible fea-
tures that made their personal data sharable or accessible to
third-party apps or the platform. Our participants informed us
that this came at the cost of functionality and usability.
“...I know about these features. I went through my phone
and disabled everything. I care about my privacy.” P4
5.3 Causes of failures
Our results suggest that limited understanding of app request
functions, insufficiency of information, and incomplete mental
models impede users from adjusting their MPDFs.
5.3.1 Limited understanding of App requests and
permission implications
Some interviewees attributed their difficulty to correctly con-
figure MPDFs’ settings to misinterpreting app request. Our
analysis also suggests that, during initial setup, users are bom-
barded with these permissions which they struggle to under-
stand. Consequently, they end up being ambivalent about the
implications of enabling or disabling MPDFs.
“...people just buy smartphones but think that they do not
necessarily need to know about its [sic] functions...the features
may be there, but they don’t understand the settings...” P10
5.3.2 Insufficient information
There is insufficient MPDF information on smartphones to
help users make informed decisions on whether they should
have them enabled or disabled. Also, our participants revealed
that there is far more information about the benefits of MPDFs
than there is information about their implications from a pri-
vacy perspective. But, some users suggested that there is in-
formation available, nevertheless it does not relay the entire
message clearly. For instance, one participant said:
“...not understanding the meaning of the exact terminol-
ogy manufacturers use and not being aware of what some ter-
minologies infer... for instance, <manufacturer> declares that
they collect essential primary data to keep your software up
to date and help improve Motorola products... but they are not
saying it as it is, what do they actually mean by help when
they are stealing my data...” P17
5.3.3 Mental Models
Prior research on mental models has suggested that users of-
ten fail to protect themselves or complete security and pri-
vacy tasks due to their limited technical understanding of sys-
tems [45, 58, 59]. We, therefore, sought to understand smart-
phone users’ general mental models with regards to MPDFs.
Our mental model analysis was based on whether participants’
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mental models played a role in the following four aspects: (1)
their decision to alter settings of a default feature, (2) how they
carried out the configuration tasks, (3) their coping behaviors,
and lastly, (4) we wanted to know if both iOS and Android
users held a particular mental model. We derived these mental
models from observing how users completed their tasks and
what they reported during the interview. Table 4 provides a
summary of these mental models.
Functionality first, settings later. Our analysis revealed
that most users prioritize functionality over privacy, especially
when they are required to carry out some configuration task.
We found that there is almost a trade-off between the two.
However, most users will opt to use a feature and then change
settings later. Some participants from this group considered
configuring MPDFs as a waste of time and a hindrance. Most
users who own this mental model often leave their MPDFs
unchanged at the initial setup of their smartphones. We also
found that this belief is shared among users who considered
the process of configuring MPDFs and privacy controls either
overwhelming or too cumbersome.
“Sometimes you have to compromise certain aspects of
your privacy for an app function like me...” P11
The internet has all the answers. To cope with some de-
fault feature configuration challenges, most users adopt a “In-
ternet has all the answers” model. This is a belief that search
engines know what they need to do. When users encountered
a challenge, they would search for their solution online. We
found that users would rather choose to search through Google
than to read their service agreements or policies. This mental
model co-exists between all smartphone users and contributes
to users changing their default feature settings. Some users use
this mental model as a coping strategy.
“No one reads a phone manual...people tend to search
Google and other search engines rather than actually check-
ing the phone manufacturers information...” P11
Privacy as a physical security attribute over privacy
inclusive of back-end protection. Many of our participants
understand privacy as a physical security attribute and be-
lieve that it had nothing to do with making sure that the plat-
form does not share data unauthorized. Many users concert
more effort securing their data from physical access rather
than through misconfigured features. When asked what they
do to preserve their privacy, they stressed using long pass-
words, screen locks, and biometric locks. This was a shared
belief between the iOS and Android users and mostly within
the Unaware group. They exhibited limited awareness of the
data sharing ecosystem that existed in their smartphones.
“...I look at privacy from the angle of... can one get into
my phone rather than can manufacturer steal my data.” P7
Mobile configurations are easy to manage. We ob-
served that after completing the first task (disabling location
settings), many participants trivialized the rest of the tasks.
We had intentionally started by asking participants to disable
location. We aimed to give users a task they may have com-
pleted before, therefore helping them to relax while taking the
study. Balebako et al. suggested that most users know how
to configure location settings [4], this was confirmed in our
study. However, we noticed a change in confidence as the task
changed and required them to configure features of which they
had hardly heard. While some users initially struggled but then
managed to complete some tasks, they admitted that they had
underestimated the tasks. When asking one participant why
they failed to disable ad tracking, they responded:
“I couldn’t find it... I think it is a lot of commitment to
configure settings.” P5
“I will try, but now I don’t think I actually know how... I
just never thought about this.” P11
Providers are trustworthy. Some users do not alter the
default features because they trust in the platform provider’s
data practices. They believe that the status of their chosen
platform speaks for itself and therefore they do not need to
worry about their data and privacy. They believed their plat-
form was secure and impenetrable hence could not share data
without their knowledge. We found this belief to be common
among iOS users, especially those who were aware of MPDFs
but not concerned about privacy, and those who were unaware
of MPDFs. When asked whether their default features could
share their sensitive data unknowingly, P13 said:
“No, I trust the device and its applications...”
Laissez Faire Attitude. When some users face difficul-
ties in adjusting or understanding the privacy implications of
some MPDFs, they resort to giving up with the belief that
the platform provider can do whatever it wants. Users with
this mental model explained that they did not mind if plat-
form providers harvested and processed their data without
their knowledge. However, users who were aware of default
features had high privacy concerns and had the expertise to ad-
just default settings, were less likely to adopt this strategy. We
found this strategy to be popular among both platform users.
“...I take a laissez-faire approach, constantly believing ev-
eryone is being spied on, so I don’t care as much... I don’t think
I’m that important...” P27
Zero check: Privacy is not a concern at initial setup.
Some users do not consider privacy at initial setup. They be-
lieve that privacy is an issue that should be revisited later on
when they have used the phone. When asked whether or not
they gave reasonable consideration to the MPDFs with regards
to privacy at initial setup, one participant said,
“...you buy a fancy phone with fancy graphics and you
think that’s fine, I don’t need to check anything...” P14
This was common among users of both platforms.
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Privacy is security. Some of our participants faced chal-
lenges differentiating privacy from security [21]. While some
confessed they did not understand the difference, we observed
during the study tasks that when asked to configure a privacy
setting, they would usually search under the security menu.
We identified this with most of Android users. We infer that
this may be because Android has a security label while iOS
does not. However, some iOS users do have this model as well.
While attempting to disable location services, P8 said:
“...now I’m going to settings and security...let me check...
it’s going to take me a while to find it...”
One-time configuration. Some users consider privacy
related configurations as a one-time process. They believe that
having disabled a feature at an initial setup that feature will
remain disabled until they actively enable it again. Most of
these users never revisit their default setting screens to check
if they still have their desired settings. However, OS upgrades
and some applications may alter their initial settings, for exam-
ple, the recent iOS upgrade defaulting back to enabling iCloud
storage for users who had disabled it before the upgrade.
No prompt, no need for configurations. Users choose
to react to prompts rather than to pre-emptively configure their
settings. When initially setting up their smartphones, some
users – the unaware group – normally bypass the setup process
of these features. Or they configure them without much con-
sideration of the impact of their decisions. They do not revisit
their settings to confirm if they have been correctly configured
– with the mindset that if there is any need to change them,
they will get a prompt requesting them to do so. Some partici-
pants even revealed that they could not consider the settings of
a feature that they do not know or that has not been run through
during initial setup. Hence, they will set it up when the need
arises which is usually through prompts. We found this mental
model to exist in both iOS and Android users. Some Android
users said,
“I didn’t even know there was an ad tracker.” P1
“...Unless it pops up would I then come to the realization
that I need to look at data settings...” P2
When asked whether their iPhone could send or download
data without their knowledge some responded:
“I don’t know if it can without my approval... can it?” P6
“when my phone tries to download things, I always re-
ceive a notification and refuse...” P23
Configurations break functionality. Some users own a
belief that altering default settings and features will break their
phone’s functionality. This results in them not changing their
default settings. We found this to be common among partic-
ipants who were less aware and informed about privacy. For
some users, it was due to negative past experiences. We ob-
served that users occasionally adopt this “thinking” as a coping
strategy especially when they do not understand the implica-
tions of disabling a certain feature. This is shared by both iOS
and Android users. One user said:
“I hope that I do not end up breaking the phone...that is
why I do not alter my device...” P7
“...when you disable the manufacturer apps you won’t be
able to get (retrieve) the pictures... it’s a bit weird...” P14
5.4 Coping Strategies
Users tended to create different coping strategies to help pal-
liate their inability to complete the configuration of MPDFs
and their privacy-related controls correctly. For easy explana-
tion, we have categorized and named these strategies. When
users fail to locate the settings of default features, it is com-
mon for them to pause and revisit their basic approaches to ad-
justing settings. It is also common for users to employ quick
fixes and avoid asking for help when they think it is some-
thing they should know. Three (3) of our participants gave up
while attempting to locate MPDF controls. However, we found
that privacy-conscious users rely on other people to configure
MPDFs. In the following, we discuss these strategies in detail.
5.4.1 Going back to the basics
While most of our participants had high self-rated exper-
tise, during the one-to-one interviews, we observed that some
might have over-rated their expertise. When they encountered
some challenges locating certain settings, some would pause
and reconsider their approaches. Most would eventually com-
plete the task correctly but with much cautiousness after first
failing to do so. On further examination, we recognized three
possible reasons why users adopt this:
– Users either underestimated the difficulty of the tasks or
assumed they understood features more than they actually
did. Users who were aware of MPDFs but with limited
concern mostly encountered this problem.
– Users placed illogical reliance on dogmatic approaches
they may have used before to accomplish similar privacy
configuration tasks. For instance, they may have trusted
some app permissions which were convenient without
considering their privacy implications, e.g., Siri.
– Failure to re-evaluate. Users did not think it was neces-
sary to revisit their settings after downloading third-party
apps that required the use of location. These kinds of apps
often lead to location service continually being enabled,
leaving users just as vulnerable as those who fail to make
the correct app permission decisions.
5.4.2 Quick fix
This category of participants was more comfortable with run-
ning searches (using search engines) to locate relevant MPDF
controls. Some participants in this group also attempted to
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install some tools such as Mobile Device Manager Plus, es-
pecially those who were unsure of how to go about locating
certain features. We observed that this group of participants
were not necessarily the most aware regarding issues relating
to privacy, nor were they the most conversant with MPDFs and
privacy controls. However, because of their self-created short-
cuts, they were able to configure and learn about MPDFs.
5.4.3 Survivalist approach
Some participants adopted a relatively withdrawn yet con-
scious approach we called “Survival approach”. They still
made some effort to complete the task but appeared to be a
bit distant, either through overthinking a previous incorrect re-
sult or not giving much thought to their actions while carrying
out the tasks. In this case, they mentioned guilt and fear from
realizing how vulnerable they were for not being able to lo-
cate some of the MPDFs. We identify their behavior as (what
we understand and assume to be) self-resignation to decisions
they had incautiously made regarding certain app requests.
They showed discomfort and regret when realizing that they
were not familiar with or did not fully understand the impact
of their actions on their privacy. To come to terms with the
implications of these features and app requests that they had
often trivialized in the past, they unconsciously adopted a sur-
vivalist approach of attempting to correctly complete the task
but not necessarily thinking about what they were doing in the
process. A handful of these participants did not complete the
tasks successfully. We identified this among users who were
privacy aware but lacked adequate awareness of MPDFs.
5.4.4 Head in the sand
This was observed in participants who were not aware of
MPDFs and their privacy implications. When they failed to
complete the exercise, they claimed that they find no reason to
change their settings. They reported that they had nothing to
hide and were less bothered about privacy infringements that
MPDFs could cause. For instance, some users did not see any
need to turn off location settings, even when they were not
necessarily using any location-based application service. We
identified this behavior across both platforms.
5.4.5 Seeking help
A number of our interviewees reported that they have asked
for help disabling or understanding the implications of some
MPDFs. They sought advice on what actions to take whenever
they noticed strange activities on their phone. Seeking help
was not only restricted to asking people, but it included search-
ing online (see, e.g., Quick fix above). This is common among
those who had a fear of being ridiculed for being ignorant. As
most users learn about MPDFs from other people, they also
seek help from those who make them aware. The most profi-
cient users among our participants revealed that this approach
had helped to increase their understanding and skills.
“...If you have friends or families that are aware or know
about privacy and security...ask someone who has skill...” P24
Our analysis suggests that this socialization of the privacy
configuration experience gives users a greater chance of cor-
rectly configuring and understanding MPDFs.
5.4.6 Trial and Error
Some participants became visibly frustrated when they could
not perform certain tasks that would ordinarily require them to
do an in-depth search under the privacy settings of the smart-
phone. They became overwhelmed at times and extended their
search to the security options. One participant even considered
the device storage application. When queried for erroneously
going that far, the participant explained that the device stor-
age icon looked attractive and aroused their curiosity to look
for the privacy feature they assumed could be hidden under
the device storage menu. Users who adopted this approach
came from the category of participants who were unaware but
privacy-conscious. P5 said,
“...it is a lot of commitment on users for manufacturers to
expect us to know how to configure all privacy setting... there
should be a video that can’t be skipped for users to abide by to
help them configure their privacy settings correctly. However,
for those who do not watch it they’ll end up like me...
5.4.7 Giving up
A few of our participants were identified to have a very low en-
durance threshold when faced with the pressure of not know-
ing how to locate and adjust certain features that could poten-
tially affect their privacy. This group simply gave up after the
first few attempts, accepting that they knew very little about
MPDFs and never really considered privacy in this context.
One participant from this group claimed to be less paranoid by
not knowing about MPDFs and believed that what they did not
know (i.e., privacy) would not hurt them. While some of these
users were not concerned about privacy, some showed interest
in knowing how to configure their MPDFs. When asked about
their own MPDF configuration practices especially about how
they deal with prompts, they reported that, in most cases, they
ignored them unless ignoring them limited functionality. We
found that participants from this category are likely to grant
most of their app permissions in exchange for functionality.
5.5 Users’ desires regarding MPDFs
Apart from a consensus on the need for users to do more to-
wards gaining knowledge about MPDFs and their privacy im-
plications, our participants raised some issues they considered
pertinent for designers to consider with regards to MPDFs,
user privacy, and smartphone interfaces. The four most com-
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mon ones were: (1) reliable and clear policy, (2) clear outline
of the implications of MPDFs, (3) MPDF configuration infor-
mation, and (4) standardized menu interfaces.
5.5.1 Reliable and clear user policies
Like other previous studies [37], participants shared their con-
cerns about the uninspiring length of privacy terms and con-
ditions although they are meant to spell out the salient points
regarding smartphone functionality and app implications. Par-
ticipants who were aware of MPDFs, privacy controls, and the
impact of app permissions, were not so interested in smart-
phone policy guides but rather on the need for greater privacy
controls allocated to users to safeguard their data from man-
ufacturers and third-party apps. This idea was popular among
users who were aware and conscious of privacy.
“...I suggest a summary sheet of ten key privacy things
sold with the device by designer...” P7
5.5.2 Unambiguous outline of the implications of
MPDFs and relevant information
Many of our participants felt that there is a dearth of adequate
information on MPDFs in general, and there is also not enough
clarity on their implications. They suggested that manufactur-
ers should adopt methods that would be more appealing, em-
powering, and proactive to inspire users to peruse policy infor-
mation regarding MPDFs and their privacy implications. One
of the participants recommended the use of short video clips
that touch on matters relating to privacy adequately since peo-
ple would be more attracted by visual than text-based content.
“...I suggest the best way is through adverts when they are
marketing the phone...I think that’s the best way to reach peo-
ple...If the companies could also use a feature on their phone
that pops up daily notifications that give information about it
(privacy)...I don’t think people are that ignorant not to want to
try to understand what it’s about...” P25
5.5.3 More ethical sincerity from app designers and
service providers regarding user privacy
Some users expressed their concern towards platform design-
ers whom they felt were not entirely sincere about user pri-
vacy. Some suggested that it would be of benefit to know how
the collated data is being stored, used, shared, and deleted as
these factors play an essential role while configuring their pri-
vacy settings.
“...there is a need for understanding the cost and benefit
of allowing certain function...it’s hard to tell if you turn off a
certain feature what that will limit you access to versus what
you are limiting others access to on your phone...” P27
5.5.4 Standardization of smartphone privacy
interfaces
During our interviews, some users reported that it was diffi-
cult to find their way to the right MPDF settings due to the
differences in smartphone user interfaces. They suggested that
standardized and less complex interfaces could help them lo-
cate and configure MPDFs easily. P20 said
“I don’t think it’s clearly laid out, the privacy settings are
all over the place...they could actually do more to categorize
them... because of how they are spread about, it tends to un-
dermine the importance...ordinary users would not take it as
seriously when it’s all over the place...they should do more...”
6 Discussion
In contrast to previous research [7, 15, 16, 24–26, 35, 54], our
work revealed the following:
– Usage or awareness of MPDFs does not necessarily imply
that users understand the implications of using such fea-
tures. Besides, we found that users cannot easily locate
and alter these settings.
– Users consider MPDFs (i.e., apps they haven’t down-
loaded) as an integral part of the platform. As a form of
trust, they were more cautious with downloaded apps than
the ones they find in their phones by default.
– While users first encounter MPDFs during their initial
smartphone setup, they are often overlooked and left un-
changed. Most users will later learn about these features
and settings from other people including family members,
friends and other online sources. Our results suggest that,
compared to other MPDFs, most people are aware of lo-
cation services because of the requests they receive from
apps that need to use location.
– Users do not understand the data sharing ecosystem of
MPDFs, that is, how these features work or what infor-
mation they collect. For instance, some users do not un-
derstand that by using Siri their information will be shared
with Apple and this may contain personal information.
– Users attribute their challenges of configuring MPDFs to
complex app requests, hidden MPDFs controls (e.g., Ads
identifier) and lack of relevant information on their impli-
cations. Some features need the user to visit several con-
figurations to disable them, for instance, to disable loca-
tion tracking on Android, a user is required to visit several
places (e.g., location control under settings and then activ-
ity tracking) to turn it off.
– Users’ coping strategies vary greatly and depend on the
challenge, how they were made aware of MPDFs, pro-
ficiency level, motivation, the time and situation. Never-
theless, both platform users deploy quick and temporary
solutions. Unlike the study in [45], users are not intimi-
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dated to ask for help. They reported that asking for help
gives them the confidence they have in their desired set-
tings, and they have the opportunity to learn more about
these features including the ones not investigated in our
study.
6.1 Android vs iOS
The majority of our participants who used the iOS platform
fell into the category of those who were MPDF aware but
unconcerned. Our interviews revealed that most of the iOS
users were only aware of MPDFs that they mostly use (e.g.,
Siri) but they were generally MPDF unaware and did not
know what data is shared with the platform provider through
MPDFs. Nevertheless, most iOS participants were less con-
cerned about MPDF privacy implications unlike some of their
Android counterparts who were mostly MPDF unaware but
had the notion that their platform provider might be collect-
ing information about them (MPDF Unaware but privacy-
conscious). Both platform users were not aware of Ads identi-
fier, usage and diagnostic reports, and analytics. However, we
found that both platform users were aware of location services
because it is a feature frequently requested by other apps.
Most Android users were likely to turn off their set-
tings than their iOS counterparts. When being made aware
of MPDFs and their privacy implications, Android users were
likely to disable. Some Android users reported having disabled
them because they were not interested in Google knowing ev-
erything about them. Some iOS users argued that their ana-
lytics data is helping Apple improve their phones. However,
when asked about Ads identifier both platform users were in-
terested in disabling it.
During the study, Android users highlighted the differ-
ences in the interface or the settings of the phone we used for
the study than the iOS users. They were more frustrated when
struggling to locate specific settings than those who used the
iOS. They ended up searching randomly for settings. Android
users who were more knowledgeable about smartphone set-
tings were able to navigate to find the settings although they
used different phones than in our study. iOS users did not com-
plain about the interface but rather, acknowledged they did not
know where such features were located.
Android users were more reactionary than pre-emptive
like iOS users. We assume this is because Apple had long im-
plemented dynamic permissions. iOS users were more likely
to trust their platform than Android users. iOS users believed
that the platform was designed with their privacy in mind. This
may be a marketing effect than a technical one.
6.2 The impact of Opt-out mechanisms
Opt-out mechanisms are created to exploit people’s behavioral
and psychological practices to encourage data disclosure. Re-
cently, for instance, Google has been found to track users’ lo-
cation even when location tracking has been turned off [17].
By default, users’ location can be tracked through web appli-
cations or activities that use locations such as maps. In order
for users to turn off location tracking, they are required first
to locate these settings, however, they may not be aware that
they exist in the first place. This highlights that manufactur-
ers in some cases use these mechanisms to suppress privacy
concerns [1].
Our results affirm that people do not change their MPDFs
for convenience reasons and, in most cases, they understand
them as manufacturer’s recommendations. This conclusion
may explain people’s privacy behaviors.
Some default features are designed or accompanied by
explanations that confuse people and may lead users to pre-
fer leaving them unchanged [8]. Some descriptions may make
people think that the safest option is to leave them untouched
hence leading to greater sharing (e.g., Google assistant opt-
out controls). Privacy behavior studies describe this as uncer-
tainties that people have about privacy [1]. Some “MPDF un-
aware” users reported that, in most cases, there are never sure
about the consequences of changing default settings and if this
would affect how their devices work.
6.3 The role of regulation
Our results suggest that consent and choice do not necessarily
provide enough control over people’s data. New regulations
should aim to balance manufacturers’ interest in users’ data
against what users may be willing to share. While platform
manufactures may fear for fewer data disclosures, policies
should encourage mechanisms that allow users not to share
information by default. For instance, a policy that is similar to
GDPR article 2 25(2) requires that the organization which col-
lects data for processing should make sure that, by default, per-
sonal data are not accessible without individuals’ intervention
(i.e., a user should act to allow data collection). Article 25 also
refers to the ‘by default’ theme by specifying that providers
should only collect data that is necessary, thus enforcing data
minimalization. Our findings, therefore, suggest that smart-
phone platform designers should refrain from using opt-out
as default settings when setting up smartphones because not
all the data collected by default may be deemed necessary for
the functionality of the phone. It should be noted that there
2 http://www.privacy-regulation.eu/en/article-25-data-protection-by-
design-and-by-default-GDPR.htm
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is no evidence that all the data collected through MPDFs are
necessary for their functionality.
6.4 Early does not equal transparency
Displaying such controls to users early during setup may seem
too desirable – as it may be interpreted as transparency. How-
ever, sometimes transparency mechanisms displayed at the
time when users are still excited about their new devices may
be ineffective. Presenting these controls at setup presents bi-
ases that even the most privacy-conscious may leave them un-
changed, not considering the future consequences because im-
mediate gratification of using the device always trumps the de-
layed one. Research has previously shown that showing users
privacy policies (i.e., firm’s data practices) before they sign
up for services is not beneficial because people do not read
them. Social networking surveys [22, 39, 52] have shown that
privacy needs change over time (i.e., at one point in our lives
we are privacy pragmatists, privacy fundamentalist, or privacy
unconcerned [61]). Hence privacy restrictions and disclosure
decisions made earlier may need to change.
Overall, the results we present show that only a handful
of users can locate and configure MPDFs. However, for those
who adjust them because of prompts, we suspect users get
prompted merely because they had initially turned them off.
6.5 Limitations
Our study has several limitations. First, we adopted conve-
nience sampling due to limited resources and geographical
proximity, and we acknowledge that this method of sampling
may introduce some hidden biases [13]. In order to minimize
biases, during the screening phase, after filtering out those who
did not qualify, we divided the whole group into two broad
groups, iOS and Android, then randomly invited people for
interviews. However, it is possible that those who took part in
the study were the ones who responded promptly, hence results
were more inclined to their usage and perceptions.
Second, during the study we were using a Motorola X (2nd
Generation) running Android 6.0 and iPhone 6 running iOS
10.3. It is likely that unfamiliarity with the phone brands and
OS versions we provided for the study could have influenced
performance or caused confusion during the task-based exer-
cises. Our results are also limited to these versions. However,
people change phones and upgrade operating systems quite of-
ten. So lack of full familiarity with the interface is a realistic
scenario encountered by users when adjusting MPDFs. For in-
stance, our Android users may be using a phone from a differ-
ent manufacturer which may have an interface that is slightly
different from the one offered by Motorola. Also, our iPhone
participants may have been using older versions of iOS than
the one used in the study.
While our findings are helpful in recognizing the chal-
lenges and the perception of MPDFs, there are limitations
to what questions our data can help us answer. Future work
and privacy discussions should consider these limitations, e.g.,
while every smartphone user has one way or another set up
their phone, we still do not know the extent to which they un-
derstood the configurations they made when setting up their
smartphone or if their configurations at all reflected their inten-
tions. Moreover, it is still not clear whether those who failed to
locate the settings of these features were not aware of them, or
even if they have not disabled them on their phones. It is pos-
sible that some users may have chosen their desired settings
during setup, i.e., for MPDFs which are displayed to users dur-
ing initial setup. Prior studies [22, 39, 52] in social networks
have found that sometimes users’ settings do not match their
intentions or show some inconsistencies.
7 Conclusions
We have studied the usability of configuring privacy of MPDFs
in smartphones. Our study highlights the complexity faced by
users in understanding the multi-faceted nature of the data eco-
system in smartphone settings and the privacy implications of
this eco-system. While there is improved awareness of data re-
quested by third-party apps – with the usage of dynamic per-
mission models within iOS and Android – the same is not true
of MPDFs. With the exception of location services, our partic-
ipants found it challenging to adjust the privacy settings for the
MPDFs in the study. Issues ranged from inability to locate the
MPDF in the first instance through to displaced mental mod-
els that focused only on password and PIN-based protection of
phones and not the leakage of data via the various features in-
herent to the phone. The configuration of MPDFs during setup
was also noted by participants as a secondary task with users
opting to skip or accept the options on offer in order to start
utilizing the phone; often not returning to adjusting those set-
tings. This naturally begs the question: with the increasing in-
corporation of more and more MPDFs that gather user data in
various forms – from virtual assistants to integrated cloud stor-
age and services – are we approaching a new frontier for pri-
vacy in smartphone settings? Our study highlights the need for
increased focus on usable privacy for MPDFs and mechanisms
to genuinely empower users in managing MPDF privacy. This
is a non-trivial challenge that requires further studies and im-
proved design of MPDFs.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Interview Guide
Thank you for participating in our study. As you read in the
consent form, we will be recording the session so we can re-
view it to make sure that we don’t miss any part of our con-
versation. Your information will be kept confidential and will
only be accessed by us. Your name will not be associated with
any data I collect. Do you have any questions regarding the
consent form? Do I have your permission to start the record-
ing?
1. What kind of smartphone do you use?
– Follow-up-1: How long have you been using it?
– Follow-up-2: Did you set it up yourself?
– Follow-up-3: Would you say it is easy?
2. Do you consider yourself to be privacy conscious?
3. How do you keep yourself safe from sharing your per-
sonal information through your smartphone?
– Follow-up-1: What kind of information are you cur-
rently not sharing?
4. Do you use the following apps?
(If iOS)
– Siri
– iCloud
– iTunes
– Maps
– Camera app
(If Android)
– Google Assistant
– Maps
– Camera app
5. Have you ever restricted apps from accessing your loca-
tion?
– Follow-up-1: Why?
– Follow-up-2: Did you do this by yourself?
– Follow-up-3: Can you show me how you would re-
strict an app from accessing your location?
[Encourage the user to share how they do it]
[Note: If the user experiences some challenges, ask the
user to share them.]
6. Can you give me an example of a default feature or app
you know?
– Follow-up-1: Do you know how to configure this fea-
ture?
– Follow-up-2: [If iOS] Can you disable your camera
app from tagging photos with location.
– Follow-up-2: [If Android] Can you please restrict
your Google app from accessing your calendar infor-
mation.
[Encourage the user to share how they would do it]
[Note: If the user experiences some challenges, ask the
user to share them.]
7. Have you ever heard of ad tracking?
– Follow-up-1: Where? What is it?
– Follow-up-2: Do you have it enabled in your phone?
– Follow-up-3: How does it work?
– Follow-up-4: Can you please disable ad tracking
from the mobile phone provided?
[Encourage the user to share how they would do it]
[Note: If the user experiences some challenges, ask the
user to share them.]
8. Have you ever experienced problems with your phone?
For example, your phone freezing during use.
– Follow-up-1: What was the problem?
– Follow-up-2: Have you ever shared crush reports with
your phone provider?
– Follow-up-3: [If Android] Do you know that by
default your phone shares this information with
providers?
– Follow-up-3: [If iOS] Do you know about diagnostic
and usage reports?
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(a) (b)
Fig. 3. Sample screenshots (a) iOS Analytics controls (b) Android
Usage & Diagnostics controls
– Follow-up-4: [If iOS] Can you please disable analyt-
ical data sharing on the phone provided?
[NOTE: If the user experiences some challenges, ask the
user to share them.]
[Explain to the interviewee that the task study has ended.]
9. How do you feel about the tasks, you have just completed?
10. What do you think should be done about this?
11. What do you think providers should do to help people un-
derstand MPDFs?
[Explain to the user that you are at the end of the inter-
view, ask them if they do have any questions or anything
they want to share about MPDFs.]
